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Abstract ; This paper considers the results of a series of two-person
bargaining experiments, and identifies some anomalous effects which
cannot be accounted for via conventional game theoretic variables. We
consider some previously unanalyzed data which lends strong support to
the hypothesis that some of this anomalous behavior can be explained by
changes in the aspirations (as distinct from the expectations) of the
players
.
Each of the experiments in this series utilized an experimental de-
sign which permits the expected utility of each bargainer for each
potential outcome to be determined. The first experiment in the series
(Roth and Malouf, 1979) showed that bargaining theories which depend
exclusively on the feasible utility payoffs to the bargainers are in-
sufficiently powerful to explain the observed phenomena. In that ex-
periment, a manipulation of information, which did not alter the set
of feasible utility payoffs, nevertheless had a dramatic impact on the
outcome of bargaining. The second experiment in the series (Roth,
Malouf, and Murnighan, 1981) was designed to investigate the hypothesis
that the effects observed in the first experiment could be explained by
the different strategies available to the bargainers in the different
information conditions. A design built around strategically equivalent
games allowed this hypothesis to be rejected. The experiment of Roth
and Schoumaker (1983) provides support for the hypothesis that the ob-
served information effect can largely be explained by the influence of
certain information on each bargainer's expectations concerning his
opponent's behavior. However the experiment of Roth and Murnighan
(1982), which was designed to explore the component causes of the ob-
served information effect, also revealed some phenomena which cannot
be fully explained by the expectations of the bargainers. The present
paper considers data drawn from the beginning of the bargaining pro-
cess which supports the hypothesis that these unexplained phenomena
can be explained by the influence of certain kinds of information on
the aspirations of the bargainers.
A fundamental assumption in much of game theory and economics is
that the structural description of a game and the (possibly cardinal)
utility functions of the players together constitute all the relevant
information needed to determine rational play. Games in which the
players possess this information are called games of complete informa-
tion. Recent research suggests, however, that information absent from
the classical models of games can systematically influence outcomes,
even in games of complete information. This paper summarizes this re-
search and examines the bargaining process to explore the causes of
some of these findings. While the studies reviewed here have provided
explanations for most of the observed bargaining behavior, one aspect
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of the experiment reported in Roth and Murnighan (1982) cannot be ade-
quately understood until the concept of aspirations is introduced. In
particular, one of the experimental manipulations in that study can be
interpreted as altering the aspirations of the players. This paper
will present an analysis of the initial stages of the negotiations which
supports this interpretation and which provides an explanation for ob-
served non-equilibrium behavior.
Experimental Results . To test theories that depend on the von
Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) expected utilities of the players, experi-
ments must permit the utility functions of the participants to be de-
termined. A class of games that makes this possible was introduced
in Roth and Malouf (1979).
In each game of that experiment, players bargained over the p_rob-
ability that they would receive a certain monetary prize, possibly a
different prize for each player. Specifically, they bargained over
how to distribute "lottery tickets" to determine the probability that
each player would win his personal lottery (i.e., a player who re-
ceived 35 percent of the lottery tickets would have a 35 percent
chance of winning his monetary prize and a 65 percent chance of win-
ning nothing). If no agreement was reached in the allotted time, each
player received nothing. A player received his prize only if an al-
lowable agreement was reached on splitting the lottery tickets and
he won the ensuing lottery. Otherwise he received nothing. We will
call games of this type binary lottery games .
To interpret the feasible outcomes of a binary lottery game in
terms of each player's utility for money, note that if each player's
utility function is normalized so that the utility for receiving his
prize is 1, and the utility for receiving nothing is 0, then his
utility for any lottery between these two alternatives is the prob-
ability, p, of winning the lottery; i.e., an agreement giving a player
p percent of the lottery tickets gives him a utility of p. A change
in the prizes is therefore equivalent to a change in the scale of the
players' utility functions.
Since the set of feasible utility payoffs to the players equals the
set of allowable divisions of lottery tickets, binary lottery games can
be used to experimentally test theories which depend on the set of
feasible utility payoffs. Note that the set of feasible utility pay-
offs does not depend on the size of the prizes. Thus if the players
know the allowable divisions of lottery tickets, the game is one of
complete information, regardless of whether each player also knows the
size of the other's prize.
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having monetary value; each played four games under either high y inter-
mediate , or low information conditions. In each condition, each player
knew the number of chips in his own prize and their monetary value,
but each player's information about his opponent's prize varied with
the condition. In the high information condition, players knew both
the number of chips in their opponent's prize and their monetary value.
In the intermediate information condition, players only knew the number
of chips in their opponent's prize. In the low information condition,
players knew neither the number of chips in their opponent's prize nor
their value. In the latter two conditions, players were prevented from
communicating the missing information about the prizes. The games were
counterbalanced in the sense that, in two of the games, the player with
the higher number of chips also had a higher value per chip (and hence a
higher value prize), while in the other two games, the player with the
higher number of chips had a lower value per chip and a lower value
prize
.
The experiment took advantage of two kinds of strategic equivalence
relations. First, binary lottery games whose prizes are expressed in
both chips and money are strategically equivalent in the low informa-
tion condition to binary lottery games with the same monetary prizes
whose prizes are expressed in money alone in the partial information
condition of the previous experiment. Any legal message in one kind
of game would be legal in the other: the strategy sets are the same,
as are the utility functions and the underlying set of alternatives.
Second, the intermediate information condition is strategicially
equivalent to the full information condition of the previous experi-
ment, if the values of tho prizes in each money game are in the same
proportion as the number of chips in the prizes in the corresponding
chip game. Again, any legal message in one kind of game can be trans-
formed into a legal message in the other kind of game by substituting
references to chips for references to money (or vice versa). Thus if
the observed difference between the partial and full information con-
ditions of the previous experiment was due to the different strategy
sets available to the players, then a similar difference should hav-e
been observed between the low and intermediate information conditions
in the Roth, Malouf, and Murnighan study. The "strategic hypothesis"
predicts that games in the low information condition should lead to
agreements in which the players receive approximately equal probabili-
ties of winning their prizes, while games in the intermediate informa-
tion condition should lead to agreements giving the player with the
smaller number of chips a significantly higher probability than his
opponent of winning his prize.
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Alternatively , the previous results may be due to social conven-
tions among the bargainers, rather than to changes in their strategy
sets. In conflicts involving a wide range of potential agreements,
social conventions may serve to make some agreements and demands more
credible than others. In particular, information about the monetary
value of the prizes gives the low prize player the ability to argue
for equal expected payoffs.
By "social conventions," v/e mean customs or beliefs commonly shared
in a particular society. To be commonly shared, such conventions must
concern familiar quantities. By stating the prizes in terms of a
neutral commodity ("chips") which conveys no information about more
familiar quantities such as the value of a given prize or a player's
probability of winning it, this experiment introduced a quantity about
which no social conventions apply. The "sociological hypothesis" pre-
dicts, therefore, that information about the number of chips in each
prize should not affect the bargaining: the low and high information
conditions of this experiment should replicate the partial and full
information conditions of the previous experiments, respectively, and
the intermediate information condition should not differ from the low
information condition.
The observed results strongly supported the sociological hypothe-
sis. Results in the low and high information conditions essentially
replicated those observed in the partial and full information condition
of the previous experiment, and intermediate information outcomes did
not differ significantly from those in the low information condition
(i.e., in the intermediate information condition, agreements tended to
give both players equal probabilities, regardless of the size of their
prize in chips). Thus information about chips did not affect the
outcomes in the same way as did strategically equivalent information
about money.
The results supporting the sociological hypothesis were somewhat
unexpected: as with the previous study, the results cannot be ex-
plained by classical game-theoretic models. The experiment of Roth and
Malouf (1979) demonstrated an information effect that could not be ac-
counted for in terms of players' preferences over outcomes. The ex-
periment of Roth, Malouf, and Murnighan (1981) showed the effect could
not be accounted for by the set of available actions. If we continue
to hypothesize that the players in these experiments acted approxi-
mately like Bayesian utility maximizers, it must be that the informa-
tion effect is due to a change in the players' subjective beliefs. For
instance, information about the prizes may influence the players'
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subjective beliefs about what agreements are likely to be acceptable to
their opponents.
An experiment designed to test this hypothesis by directly manipu-
lating players' expectations about their opponents' behavior is re-
ported in Roth and Schoumaker (1983). In that experiment, subjects
were unaware that they initially bargained with a series of programmed
opponents, whose behavior was designed to alter their expectations
about what kinds of agreements were likely to be acceptable. When
bargainers were subsequently paired with bargainers with consistent
expectations, the different expectations in the different experimental
conditions led to different outcomes, consistent with those observed
in the different information conditions of the experiments discussed
above. So the results of this experiment support the hypothesis that
the information effect observed in the above experiments is due to the
effect of information on the players' expectations.
The experiment discussed next (Roth and Murnighan, 1982) was de-
signed to explore the component elements of this information effect.
It has, in addition, revealed some phenomena that cannot be fully ex-
plained in terms of the players' expectations.
In all of the previous studies either both players had information
about each other's prizes, or they only had information about their
own prize. The difference between the outcomes in the different infor-
mation conditions could be an effect which depends on (i) whether the
player with the higher prize knows both prizes; (ii) whether the
player with the lower prize knows both prizes; or (iii) an interaction
which occurs only when both players know both prizes.
Also, in the previous experiments, it was "common knowledge" whether
the bargainers knew one another's prizes. Information is common knowl-
edge in a game if it is known to all of the players, and if, in addi-
tion, every player knows that all the players know, and that every
player knows the others know that he knows, and so forth (cf. Aumann,
1975; Lewis, 1969; Milgrora, 1981). In general, two bargainers can be
thought of as having common knowledge about an event if the event oc-
curs when both of them are present to see it, so that they also se<_
each other seeing it, etc.
Information which is common knowledge does not have "deniability"
:
neither player can credibly deny that he knows it. This experiment was
designed to distinguish the effects of this kind of deniability by
manipulating whether each player's awareness or ignorance of his op-
ponent's prize is common knowledge. In addition, it was designed to
give the players sufficient scope for strategic manipulation so as to
permit at least a preliminary assessment of whether the observed out-
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comes result from equilibrium behavior. The bargaining outcomes from
this study are reported in Roth and Murnighan (1982); introduction and
analysis of the bargaining process and the strategies used by the
players is presented for the first time here.
Method
Two players, one with a $20 prize and the other a $5 prize, played
three identical binary lottery games, against different, anonymous op-
ponents. The experiment used a 4 (information) x 2 (common knowledge)
factorial design. The information conditions were: (1) Neither knows
his opponent's prize; (2) The $20 player knows both prizes, but the $5
player knows only his own prize; (3) The £5 player knows both prizes,
but the $20 player knows only his own prize; and (4) Both players know
both prizes. The second factor made this information common knowledge
for half the bargaining pairs, and not common knowledge for the other
half. For instance, when the $20 player is the only one who knows both
prizes, then the (common) instructions to both players in the common
knowledge condition reveal that the $20 player will know both prizes
and that the $5 player will know only his own in the game about to be
played. In the noncommon knowledge condition, the $20 player still
knows both prizes, and the $5 player still knows only his own prize,
but both players are told that the other bargainer may or may not know
their prize.
Subjects . One hundred and seventy-six (176) students participated
in this study. Almost all were recruited from Economics classes at
the University of Illinois. Volunteers understood that they would be
obtaining money in an experiment on bargaining, and that their exact
outcome would be determined by their play in the games. Of the 264
negotiations, technical difficulties resulted in the loss of data from
1 negotiation; the results are based, then, on the remaining 263.
Procedure . Players were seated at visually isolated computer ter-
minals. Background information including a brief review of probability
theory was presented first. The procedures for sending messages and
proposals were then introduced. A proposal was a pair of numbers, the
first being the sender's probability of receiving his prize and the
second the receiver's probability. The proposal was displayed on a
graph of the feasible region, along with its expected monetary value.
Proposals were binding on the sender, and an agreement was reached when-
ever one of the bargainers returned a proposal identical to the one he
had just received. Messages were not binding. Bargainers could send
any message they wished, with one exception. To insure anonymity, the
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monitor intercepted any messages that revealed the identity of the
players
.
Participants were instructed that "your objective should be to
maximize your own earnings by taking advantage of the special features
of each session." Players were informed of the time remaining, and
were given 12 minutes to reach each agreement. The computer recorded
all the messages, proposals, and agreements, and conducted the lotter-
ies at the end of the experiment.
Previous Results
Table 1 displays the agreements reached (disagreements excluded)
in the different conditions. The findings were clear: Providing the
$5 player with information about the $20 player's prize leads to an
average of the agreements that is very close to half way between 20-80
(the equal expected value payoff) and 50-50 (the equal outcome payoff)
Indeed, the underlying distribution is bimodal, with almost equal fre-
quencies of the 20-80 and 50-50 payoffs. On the other hand, when the
$5 player had no information about the $20 prize, most of the agree-
ments were 50-50.
Table 1 ; Mean Outcomes to the $20 and $5 Players in Each
Information-Common Knowledge Condition When
Agreements were Reached (disagreements excluded)
Not Common
Knowledge
47.5 52.5
49.1 50.9
37.2 62.8
34.3 65.7
Note: Outcomes are the mean lottery percentages obtained by the $20
players (expressed first) and the $5 player when they reached
agreement.
Analysis of the disagreements indicated that, in conditions where
the $5 player knew both prizes and this information was not common
knowledge, there were more disagreements than in the other six condi-
tions (F(l,258) = 7.27, p < .01). The mean outcomes, including dis-
agreements, are shown in Table 2.
Common
Information Knowledcie
Neither knows 48.8 51.2
$20 knows 43.6 56.4
$5 knows 33.6 66.4
Both know 30.8 69.2
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Table 2 ; Mean Outcomes to the $20 and $5 Players in Each
Information-Common Knowledge Condition Over All
Interactions (disagreements included as zero
outcomes)
Common Knowledge Not Common Knowledge
Information $20 Player $5 Player $20 Player $5 Player
Neither knows 4 l«6 a b 43 -3 c 43 » 5a 48 - 2
$20 knows 34 -9 DC 45 - 1 bc 40 - 9 a 42 - 4
$5 knows 27.
2
C 53.6 ab 25. b 42.0
Both know 27. C 56 « 4 a 25 « 5 b 48 - 8
Note: Within a column, means with common subscripts are not signifi-
cantly different from one another using the Mann-Whitney U test
(a = .01); none were significantly different in the Not-Common-
Knowledge conditions for the $5 player.
Comparison of these outcomes in the $20 Knows and the $5 Knows con-
ditions showed that, in the not common knowledge conditions, the value
of being informed is quite similar: When disagreement outcomes are
included, both the $20 and the $5 players averaged approximately the
same number of lottery tickets (40.9% vs. 42.0%). In the common
knowledge conditions, however, the $5 player averaged 53.6% and the
$20 player averaged only 34.9%. Thus, the $20 player was not making
as good use of his monopoly on information as was the $5 player.
Where the not common knowledge conditions appear to be in equilibrium
with respect to the different players' usage of information, that is
not the case in the common knowledge conditions. (See Roth and
Murnighan, 1982, where this is discussed at length.)
New Analyses
Here we inspect the players' strategies to investigate the cause
of the nonequilibrium behavior observed in the common knowledge condi-
tion. Specifically, we seek to explain why the $20 player in the $20
Knows condition bargained less effectively than the $5 player in the
$5 Knows condition. Note that this result cannot be explained by
hypothesizing that the informed players had different expectations con-
cerning their opponent's behavior in these two information conditions.
In each case the informed player is faced with an opponent who is not
informed, and this fact is common knowledge. Likewise, in both condi-
tions the uninformed player has the same information: he knows his
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own prize only, and that his opponent knows both prizes. Thus, the in-
formed player's expectation about the uninformed player's actions
should be the same in both cases, and vice versa.
One hypothesis to account for the difference in the two conditions
is that information about both prizes affects the aspirations of the
two players in different ways. The $5 player, when he knows both
prizes, may hope to overcome his lower prize by obtaining a much higher
probability of winning his prize, while the $20 player may simply hope
to maintain his privileged position. If this hypothesis is correct,
it should be reflected by differences in the strategies chosen by the
players in the earliest stages of the negotiations. In particular,
our analyses focus on the initial demands made by the players and the
nature of the messages they send throughout their interaction.
Of the eight conditions in this experiment, only the two discussed
above (the $20 and $5 Knows conditions when players had common knowl-
edge) provide manipulations of aspirations that are potentially uncon-
founded by different expectations about opponents' behavior. For ex-
ample, in the Both Knows-Common Knowledge condition, the $20 player
has the same information about the prizes that he does in the $20 Knows
condition. While his aspirations may be the same in both conditions,
his expectations of his opponent's behavior will be influenced by his
knowledge that his opponent knows both prizes. While the $20 and $5
players may have the same aspirations as they held when only they were
informed, they must now consider how their opponent's information might
affect his aspirations, and modify their expectations accordingly. In
the not common knowledge conditions, even when one of the players is
informed, that player is uncertain about whether the other player is
also informed.
New Results
Demands . The players' first demands were analyzed in a 4 (infor-
mation conditions) x 2 ($20 vs. $5 player) analysis of variance for
the common knowledge condition, with information a between variable
and player a within, repeated variable. Results showed a significant
effect for players, F(l,109) = 37.28, p < .0001, and a significant
information by players interaction, F(3,109) = 6.98, p < .0002. Post
hoc tests of the interaction (see Table 3) indicated that the $5 player
demanded more in the common knowledge conditions where he had informa-
tion about the $20 player's prize; in all of the other conditions, the
players' first demands did not significantly differ from one another.
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Table 3 . The Mean First Demands of the Players in the Different
Information Conditions when the Players had Common
Knowledge
Mean First Demands by
Information Condition $20 Player $5 Player
Neither Knows 67
-
4 b 69 « 4 b
$20 Player Knows 67.
6
b 71. 7 b
$5 Player Knows 62.
9
b 80.
8
a
Both Know 61. b 83 « 8 a
Note: Cells with common subscripts are not significantly different
from one another at the .05 level using the Newman-Keuls
procedure
.
Messages . Typically the $20 players chose one of two types of mes-
sages: those which make no mention of the prizes and those which mis-
represent the value of their prize. Not mentioning the prizes was
chosen more frequently. The number of misrepresentations were great-
est in the $20 Knows-Common Knowledge condition.
The $20 players' outcomes did not vary significantly as a function
of the type of message they sent. However, disagreements increased
slightly when they misrepresented their prize, leading to lower overall
outcomes. In addition, when used in the Both Know-Not Common Knowledge
condition, many disagreements occurred. Misrepresenting your payoff
when your opponent knows what it is, is not an effective strategy.
The $5 player primarily sent three types of messages: those which
make no mention of the prizes (most frequent when neither knew) , those
which reveal his information (most frequent in the $5 and Both Know
conditions), and those which misrepresent (infrequently). Players who
were silent about the prizes obtained lower average payoffs when
agreements were reached than did those who revealed, but they also
were involved in fewer disagreements. The two types of messages re-
sulted in the same average outcomes. The $5 players who misrepre-
sented received both higher payoffs when they were included in agree-
ments and had fewer disagreements; the relative infrequency of this
type of message, however, makes conclusions regarding its effective-
ness very tenuous.
These results focus on all eight of the conditions. In the two
conditions of most interest for the aspirations hypothesis (the $20
Knows- and the $5 Knows-Common Knowledge conditions), the $20 player
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misrepresented often (13 times in 30 interactions) and the $5 player
revealed his information often (13 times in 26 interactions). The
fact that the players' outcomes appear to be more a function of their
different demands, rather than these message types (which had little
effect, in particular, on the $20 players' outcomes), highlights the
importance of those demands.
Discussion
As negotiations proceed, each bargainer has the opportunity to re-
vise his expectations as to what agreements his opponent may find ac-
ceptable. At advanced stages in the negotiations, the effects of the
bargainers' initial aspirations presumably become more difficult to
separate from the effects of their updated expectations concerning
their opponent's behavior. Thus, our analysis concentrated on the
first demand issued by each bargainer: these are the demands which
most closely reflect their initial aspirations and expectations.
As was argued earlier, only the $20 Knows- and $5 Knows-Common
Knowledge conditions potentially provide an unconfounded manipulation
of the players' aspirations, since only in this pair of conditions is
there no reason for the informed player to have different expectations
about the uninformed player, or vice versa. Thus, the fact that the
$5 players made significantly higher first demands than the $20 players,
when they were informed, suggests that informed $5 players have higher
initial aspirations than the informed $20 players. This in turn sup-
ports the hypothesis that the reason informed $20 players met with less
success than did informed $5 players (as reflected by their final pay-
offs) is that they had lower initial aspirations.
The fact that higher aspirations can lead to "tougher" bargaining
is consistent with findings reported by Siegel and Fouraker (1960).
The fact that these opening demands result in higher payoffs for the
$5 player is consistent with results reported in another context by
Yukl (1974). They are also similar to results in the area of goal
setting (Latham and Yukl, 1975), which show that a difficult but spe-
cific goal (such as obtaining an equal expected value outcome) leads
to more effective performance than "doing your best" (which may be
quite similar to the aspirations and motivations of the $20 player).
Finally, the results are similar to findings in yet another context,
bargaining in coalition situations (Murnighan, Komorita, and
Szwajkowski, 1977), which indicated that a competitive reference group
led to more competitive bargaining behavior.
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